What is a Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction?

“[A] preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) It requires a person to refrain from a particular act; it may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof; and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 525; Comfort v. Comfort, (1941) 17 Cal.2d 736, 741.)

“[A]n order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the action can be determined.” (Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 890-91.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.)

Legal Standard

In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 533; Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85.)

Burden of Proof

The restrained party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that one of these circumstances is present and justifies a termination of the injunction. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) The trial court may determine that the changed circumstances alleged by the restrained party are not material and, therefore, do not present a reason for terminating the injunction. (Id. at 1506.)

Ultimately, “granting, denying, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a permanent or preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case.” (Prof'l Engineers v. Dep't of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 562.) Although the court has broad discretion, it “must exercise its discretion ‘in favor of the party most likely to be injured.’” (Robbins v. Super. Ct. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205.) The ultimate goal is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. (American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 622, 637.)

Useful Rulings on Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction

Recent Rulings on Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction

351-375 of 10000 results

WINBORN VS. TRIVEC-AVANT CORPORATION

In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel’s cost estimate and the administrator fee estimate at the preliminary approval stage were grossly overstated, making the class notice misleading.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

JIMENEZ VS. FCI LENDER SERVICES, INC.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement is granted, except that in the Notice of Class Action Settlement, in ¶3 on p. 3, line 8, plaintiff must change “Final Fairness and Approval Hearing” to “Final Approval Hearing”. A Final Approval Hearing is set for March 5, 2021 at 10:00 a.m.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

CITY OF MONROVIA VS PAULINE WHITE, ET AL

Defendant White’s motion to expunge lis pendens was denied, including the requests for other remedies in that motion such as vacating a preliminary injunction or returning sanctions paid. Plaintiff the City’s motion for attorneys’ fees it incurred to prevail in the appeal of the trial court’s anti-SLAPP orders was granted and the court awarded the sum requested, $102,669.00.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

LAMED ENTERPRISES VS MARBLE BROS., ET AL.

Plaintiff also seeks a preliminary injunction pending the judgment, and a permanent injunction thereafter. (Id., ¶25.) Defendants argue that the declaratory relief cause of action fails essentially based on the lack of substantive merit of the claim. However, at this stage, the Court will overrule the demurrer on the basis that the claim lacks substantive merit. Whether DDR and Bachar are or are not bound by the Judgment and Settlement Agreement is something that is at controversy and may be adjudicated.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

HERNANDEZ VS FUNTASTIC, INC.

Plaintiffs Adriana Hernandez and Jane Doe I's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and PAGA Action Settlement Plaintiffs Adriana Hernandez and Jane Doe 1’s motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. While the Court’s ordinary procedure is to continue preliminary approval motions for the parties to address items of concern, it believes the settlement as currently structured is too flawed for approval.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

DAVIS VS PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY

Plaintiff Delfina Medina's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is CONTINUED to December 4, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CX104 to permit the parties to respond to the following items of concern. Any supplemental briefing shall be filed on or before November 20, 2020.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

LIBERTY SURPLUS INSURANCE CORPORATION VS LTD CONSTRUCTION

(Opposition at pp. 11-12. ) At the preliminary hearing, Burnside testified that his statement in his affidavit was “how I initially understood it when I talked to him.” (Plaintiff’s Ex. 3 at p. 168.) Brown testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not tell Burnside that he saw a male pour a liquid. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 3 at p. 101.) None of these statements is a concession of illegality. They may be concessions of mistakes or sloppiness or inaccuracies. The testimony of Burnside and Brown may conflict.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

  • Type

    Insurance

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

LAKE VS DISCOUNT COURIER SERVICES, INC.

Plaintiff Adam Lake's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

GARCIA VS. LEE

The tentative ruling is to continue the hearing on plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Partial Settlement with Defendant Kee Jae Lee and Motion for Preliminary Approval of Partial Settlement with Defendants Young Tae Beck, Young Beck Realty Corp., and B & Lee, Inc.to December 18, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. Counsel must file supplemental papers addressing the court’s concerns (not fully revised papers that would have to be re-read) at least 16 days before the next hearing date.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

ALEXANDER RAMLIE, ET AL. VS HANNAH ASHBY, ET AL.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Undertaking A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 529(a); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Ass’n (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.)

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

LOGACHEV VS CERNA HEALTHCARE, LLC

Plaintiff Victor Logachev's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement and for an Order; 1)Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement; 2)Directing Distribution of Notice of Settlement; and 3)Setting a Hearing for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement is CONTINUED to December 18, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CX104 to permit the parties to respond to the following items of concern.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

MAXWELL DREVER, ET AL VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., ET AL

On January 27, 2020, the court entered a TRO and order to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The TRO was conditioned on Plaintiffs’ payment 0f$26,115,69 pursuant to the parties’ May 2013 loan modification agreement. Plaintiffs never made that payment, so the TRO never became operational, On February 21, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ application for preliminary injunction.

  • Hearing

    Oct 30, 2020

DONALD MARKHAM V. QUIK STOP MARKETS, INC., ET AL.

At preliminary approval, the Court found that the proposed settlement provides a fair and reasonable compromise to plaintiff’s claims, and that the PAGA settlement is genuine, meaningful, and fair to those affected. It finds no reason to deviate from these findings now, especially considering that there are no objections. The Court finds that the settlement is fair and reasonable for purposes of final approval. III.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

ADAM HOLT V. BLUE BOTTLE COFFEE, INC., ET AL.

., “whether known or unknown, in connection with or that arise out of or relate in any manner whatsoever, in whole or in part, to any claim or legal arguments asserted, or that could have been asserted, in the Holt Action, including any claim based on any alleged failure by a Released Party to redeem a gift card with a balance of less than $10.00 for cash from September 16, 2015, through the Preliminary Approval Date.”

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

WALSH VS. FRYS

Initially, the Court had some concerns about the settlement, but these were addressed in the preliminary approval process, including provision of an addendum to the settlement. That discussion will not be repeated. Since the preliminary approval, the parties have given the required notice, and there have been no objections or requests for exclusion. The reasons that justified the preliminary approval still apply, and the settlement is approved. Counsel are to prepare a final judgment.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

DAVID GOMES INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ASSIGNEE OF JABBA LLC A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL. VS VERNON M. HILDEBRANDT, ET AL.

The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: Conversion; Fraud; To cancel written instrument; To cancel grant deed; Breach of real estate purchase contract; Negligence; Injunction. Defendants demur to the second and seventh causes of action. The demurrer is unopposed. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on October 26, 2020. This was untimely under Code of Civil Procedure § 472(a), which requires an amended pleading be filed by the time the opposition to the demurrer is due.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Personal Injury/ Tort

  • Sub Type

    Fraud

  • Judge

    Maurice A. Leiter or Salvatore Sirna

  • County

    Los Angeles County, CA

ARMEN AYVAZYAN VS BOONSIENG BENJAUTHRIT

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff contends that the demurrer is untimely because “California Code of Civil Procedure r430.40 [sic] equires [sic] that a demurrer be filed within 10 days of service of process . . .” (Opp. 2:17-19.) This is incorrect. “A person against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may, within 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint, demur to the complaint or cross-complaint.” ( Code Civ Proc. § 430.40.)

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

SAINT ANDREWS EQUITIES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LLC VS CURRY PARKWAY L.P., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.

Elad became aware of the lis pendens in a preliminary title report when it opened escrow on September 22, 2020. There is no opposition. Thus, plaintiff has not met its burden of showing that the real property claims have probable validity by a preponderance of evidence.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Real Property

  • Sub Type

    Foreclosure

FORTIFI FINANCIAL, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION VS NORBERTAS SINICA, ET AL.

Instead, Respondents raised the issue for the first time at the first preliminary hearing on June 29, 2020 – some five months after FortiFi filed its claim. (Gross Decl. ¶ 4.) After the parties briefed the issue of arbitrability, the arbitrator rendered its decision on July 27, 2020. (Gross Decl. Exh. E.)

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

ANIMAL PROTECTION AND RESCUE LEAGUE INC VS RAMIREZ

Similarly, the Westfield Defendants' evidence that they terminated their lease with Defendant Bark Avenue Pets, LLC shortly upon receiving notification from Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs would be seeking a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against Bark Avenue Pets does not require a finding that Plaintiffs' attempt to obtain injunctive relief against the Westfield Defendants was meritless.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Other

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

BERGMAN V. BJS&T ENTERPRISES INC [E-FILE]

The court instructed Plaintiff's counsel at hearing on the motion for preliminary approval that "the Final Approval Hearing contemplates a single motion. If Plaintiff intends to file any additional motions, such as attorney's fees, those motions must be scheduled separately." (ROA 37.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff filed a single motion for final approval inclusive of a request for attorney's fees.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Employment

  • Sub Type

    Other Employment

GRAB VS THE CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD

Although plaintiff is not currently seeking injunctive relief, it is not impermissible to assert the second affirmative defense prohibiting injunction in the event plaintiff seeks leave to amend. Plaintiff's arguments about lack of evidence are more appropriately addressed in a motion for summary judgment or at trial.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Business

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

KATZIR VS. DEL SOL RCFE, INC.

A plain reading of the statute indicates that as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement's existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.” Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218–219. “Once the petitioners had alleged that the agreement exists, the burden shifted to respondents to prove the falsity of the purported agreement.” Id., at 219.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

KRAMER VS GASTON

.* On the Dept. 72 ex parte calendar on January 30, 2020, Kramer sought a TRO and an OSC re preliminary injunction. ROA 12-18. The court granted a very limited TRO (i.e., Gaston and his agents are precluded from any engaging in any sale of Kramer's shares in OFG under the by-laws) and set an OSC re preliminary injunction and a briefing schedule. ROA 20-22. Opposition and reply papers were filed. ROA 27-33, 40-42.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Other

  • Sub Type

    Intellectual Property

SALEM VS LEONNE

Evidence of events that occurred prior to issuance of the Preliminary Injunction cannot be used to establish a violation of the Preliminary Injunction. Moreover, events that occurred after issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order but prior to issuance of the Preliminary Injunction were already considered by this Court in support of issuing the Preliminary Injunction. Those events (between June 9-July 10) cannot be reconsidered as a violation of the Preliminary Injunction.

  • Hearing

    Oct 29, 2020

  • Type

    Contract

  • Sub Type

    Breach

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